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Abstract
This article examines some arguments in favor of taking peace as a political obligation that
can be found in one of the most important founders of the pacifist movement, Jane Addams.
The main focus is on her 1907 book Newer Ideals of Peace, which has often been read as ide-
alistic and outdated, and above all, as more of an activist’s manifesto than a serious con-
tribution to either political philosophy or political theory. I point out that this owes much
to an ambiguity of Addams’ criticisms of the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan defense
of peace as a political ideal, the ambiguity between practical-political and conceptual prob-
lems. However, Addam’s succeeds in identifying one profound problem for traditional,
even enlightended institution-centered ideals of peace, the collapse of the very ideal in
cases of breaches of explicit peace-agreements among nations, because breaches of agreements
are tantamount to the loss of all commitment to the other nation’s rights. It reveals that
the conditions imposed by such ideals are at most necessary, but not sufficient for peace,
and hence that the concept based on them is not a complete concept of lasting peaceful
conditions among humans. Once it is seen as dedicated to resolving the problems entailed
by this fundamental problem, Addams’ work, and in particular her focus on resources of
solidarity and right-granting practices beyond and outside explicit agreements between
governments can be understood as the development of a more adequate, coherent and
comprehensive, while also a more actionable conception of peace. In the course of this
development, Addams can also be observed to make use of crucial epistemological and
more technical philosophical tools that are most closely associated with classical pragma-
tism, but which partly appear (albeit largely obliquely in the course of their application to
a particular case) for the first time Addams’ treatise. Addams’ work is therefore of more
than merely political activist interest for philosophers. Nonetheless, the article also explains
her status as an important contributor to proper conceptions of world peace and the under-
standing of certain phenomena in the organization of public will formation precisely by
pointing out that without some of her future-oriented proposals, like the inseparability of
peace-policies and development, or the need to institutionally protect and foster spontaneous
solidary action, the best contemporary work on peace would not have been possible.
Keywords: Jane Addams; pragmatism; Kant; peace; cosmopolitanism; normative role of
affective states and solidarity.
Enrahonar 46, 2011 93-122
How to continue Kant’s Perpetual Peace with Addams’




Resumen. Cómo continuar la Paz perpetua de Kant con los Nuevos ideales de paz de Addams
Este artículo examina algunos de los argumentos a favor de considerar la paz como una
obligación política que se puede encontrar en una de las fundadoras más relevantes del
movimiento pacifista, Jane Addams. El foco principal se encuentra en su libro de 1907,
Newer Ideals of Peace, que a menudo ha sido leído como idealista y obsoleto y, sobre todo,
más como un manifiesto activista que una contribución seria tanto a la filosofía como a la
teoría política. Aquí argumento que esto se debe principalmente a una ambigüedad de las
críticas de Addams a la defensa tradicional y kantiano-cosmopolita de la paz en cuanto a ideal
político, a la ambigüedad entre problemas práctico-políticos y conceptuales. Aún así,
Addams consigue identificar un profundo problema en los ideales de paz tradicionales, o
incluso en los ideales ilustrados centrados en las instituciones, a saber, el colapso de este
ideal en casos de violaciones de tratados de paz explícitos entre naciones, puesto que las
violaciones de estos acuerdos equivalen a la pérdida de todo compromiso con los derechos
de la otra nación. Esto revela que las condiciones impuestas por tales ideales son como
mucho necesarias, pero no suficientes, para la paz, y por lo tanto el concepto basado en
ellas no es un concepto completo de las condiciones para la paz duradera entre humanos.
Una vez que se haya considerado el trabajo de Addams (y en particular su atención a los
recursos de solidaridad y a las prácticas de concesión de derechos más allá y fuera de acuer-
dos explícitos entre gobiernos) como dedicado a resolver los problemas que entraña este
problema fundamental, su labor puede ser entendida como el desarrollo de una concep-
ción de la paz más adecuada, coherente, comprensiva y a la vez más práctica. En el curso de
este desarrollo también se puede ver cómo Addams hace uso de herramientas epistemoló-
gicas cruciales y filosóficamente más técnicas que están más estrechamente relacionadas
con el pragmatismo clásico pero que aparecen en parte (aunque mayormente de forma
oblicua a loa largo de su aplicación a un caso particular) y por primera vez en el tratado
de Addams. Para los filósofos, pues, el trabajo de Addams tiene más que un simple inte-
rés activista y político. Sin embargo, este artículo también explica el estatus de Addams
como una contribuyente importante a concepciones adecuadas de paz mundial y la com-
prensión de ciertos fenómenos en la organización de la formación de la voluntad pública
precisamente indicando que sin alguna de sus propuestas orientadas hacia el futuro, como
la inseparabilidad de políticas para la paz y el desarrollo o la necesidad de proteger y pro-
mover institucionalmente la acción solidaria espontánea, la mejor obra contemporánea
sobre la paz no hubiera sido posible.
Palabras clave: Jane Addams; pragmatismo; Kant; paz; cosmopolitismo; papel normativo
de los estados afectivos y la solidaridad.
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In this article, I will examine some of the arguments in favor of taking the
strife after peace as politically obligatory that can be found in one of the most
important founders of the pacifist movement, Jane Addams. Born in 1860 to
a well-to-do family, and raised in the small town world of the mainly protes-
tant American Midwest, she soon decided to use her access to education to
actively engage in improving the living conditions, opportunities and political
rights of women, immigrants, the urban poor, and other groups that found
themselves living in the paradox situation of living in a large democracy and yet
being deprived of the most essential rights, equipments and opportunities to
partake in this society. Women without vote, beaten up by drunk husbands
after long work-days in factories without workers’ safety, immigrant families
without dwelling and even language to voice their suffering, and children of the
poor condemned to work instead of going to school and have a chance to lift
themselves out of this condition —such were the phenomena Jane Addams
primarily reacted to, and the phenomena that she demanded to be changed.
Comparable to Rosa Luxemburg in Germany and La Pasionaria in Spain, Jane
Addams grew into one of the most important activists and theorists for the
classical progressive causes at the beginning of the 20th century. She founded
and fought in associations for the female right to vote (accomplished in 1919
in the US), invented the modern form of safe houses for the education, nour-
ishment and protection of the poor and victims of domestic violence in Chica-
go we nowadays take for granted as social centers, and also untiringly until
the end of her life in 1935 fought for the abolition of war within the framework
and as the leader of one of the earliest and oldest NGO’s, the Women’s Inter-
national League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), the organization that draft-
ed the essential outlines of Woodrow Wilson’s proposals for a league of nations
for the prevention of another World War after WWI. In this sense, Addams
can count as one of the conceptual grandmothers of the United Nations. These
efforts were recognized with her reception of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1931.
Nonetheless, and astonishingly enough, Jane Addams has not made it into the
European consciousness, which is one of the secondary motivations for this
article, namely, to introduce the name and thought of one of the most impor-
tant feminist, pacifist and pragmatist thinkers of the early 20th century as a
voice that still has some interesting things to contribute to contemporary dis-
cussions of war, peace, and international relations. Jane Addams herself acted
more often as a public intellectual and engaged activist for her causes than as
an ambitious theorist, and this is how most of her contemporary readers still
treat her —as an exemplary personality to be emulated in today’s still urgent
fights for women’s rights, against poverty and war at the level of NGOs. Many
of those, for example, who admire Addams’ work as feminists, social and polit-
ical theorists or historians of ideas, mainly have her in mind as a person who
always refused to take up an academic position, in spite of repeated attempts
of John Dewey (no less) to make her professor of sociology in Chicago, and
who stressed the power of emotions, community organization, self-empower-
ment and the standpoint-related insights of women for the practical and polit-
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ical realization of certain agendas. However, in most of these sympathetically
intended accounts of Jane Addams, the power of her challenging ideas to trans-
form, e.g., Dewey’s and Mead’s psychological and sociological ideas is com-
pletely forgotten. It is forgotten, for example, that Dewey’s metaethical theo-
ry and moral psychology changed profoundly under explicit recognition of
Addams’ challenges to account for the affective as well as intellectual parts and
consequences of behavior. Dewey’s mature views, as they appear for example
in his brilliant little book Theory of Valuation (1939)1, but also his conversion
from a defender of war to a radical pacifist in the treatise The Outlawry of War
(1921)2 are to the largest degree a consequence of his academic interaction
with Addams and her circle. In other words, Addams’ influence cannot be lim-
ited to the passing historical merits of an active political life with intellectual
views that are, at best, naive and well-meaning (which is how friends and foes
uniformly end up taking her when they stress her activism). Instead, as I will
argue in this paper, Jane Addams’ indeed often very straightforward and
unadorned admonitions to account for the fundamental importance of phe-
nomena —I will call them «solidary practices»— that are not in the traditional
canon of ideas when it comes to do political theory and philosophy are still
today of a very high value when it comes to properly assess and understand
the very idea of «lasting peace», be it as an aim of international relations, or
be it as a concept in political philosophy.
My essay will proceed in the following way: First, I will present some basic
arguments and criticisms that Addams develops in her 1907 book Newer Ideals
of Peace3 vis-a-vis the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan formulation and
defense of peace as a political ideal (1). A closer inspection of the real differences
with Kant’s cosmopolitan project will allow me to point to and address a cer-
tain ambiguity in the understanding of the sort of criticism Addams seems to
have in mind, the ambiguity between practical-political and conceptual prob-
lems generated by remaining wedded to the old ideals (2). I will then distin-
guish one problem raised in Addams’ criticism as fundamental. This is the
problem that traditional and even enlightened and democratic ideals of peace
that are exclusively couched in terms of the explicit juridified regulation of
international relations collapse in cases of breaches of explicit peace-agree-
ments among nations (3). This problem is fundamental because it reveals that
the conditions imposed by the traditional, even enlightened institution-centered
ideal are at most necessary, but not sufficient for peace, and hence the con-
cept based on them not a complete concept of lasting peaceful conditions
among humans. Once the problem is identified, I will present an example
from her post WWI work in Peace and Bread in Time of War (4) that outlines
in which ways Addams’ insistence on the fundamental and indispensable role
of developing active policies in favor of extra-gubernatorial and interpersonal
1. Dewey, John (1972). Theory of Valuation. Chicago: Chicago University Press (orig. 1939).
2. Dewey, John (1927). The Outlawry of War. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Colby.
3. Addams, Jane (2007). Newer Ideals of Peace. Chicago/Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
96 Enrahonar 46, 2011 Axel Mueller
relationships and associations across national boundaries, as well as the removal
of social and economic discrimination and exclusion for the very ideal of peace
can help in the development of a more adequate, coherent and comprehen-
sive, while also a more actionable conception of peace (5). The analysis of the
consequences of this re-conception will shed light on the degree to which
Addams makes use of epistemological and more technical philosophical tools
that are most closely associated with classical pragmatism (6), and thus sup-
port the view that Addams’ work is of more than merely political activist inter-
est for philosophers.
In this final assessment, I will also point out how Addams’ additional
requirements on such a coherent peace-concept also yield a potent argument
in favor of the political obligation for socio-economical as well as human rights
policies for discriminated individuals in all parts of the world that only recent-
ly (after the cold war) have found active defenders among theorists and, more
importantly, the actors at the level of, e.g., the UN. At the level of political
theory, such a deepened understanding of what the ideal of peace ought to
contain to count as an actual idea of peace can moreover help understand, for
example, why precisely at a time at which civilizing international by reaching
regulations and agreements seems more likely and easier than ever before, the
number and variety of advocacy-organizations and NGOs does not decrease,
but to the contrary, we observe a more than proportional increment of ever
more and more vociferous structures of self-organization across national, eth-
nic and other boundaries. Why is this so? Isn’t regulation a success, and often
enough for peace? Aren’t regulations following one demand after another? And
shouldn’t we expect such numbers to go down, at least a bit, at least some-
where, when the UN «works down the list»? Addams’ political theory can be
of great help in seeing how it is that precisely when regulation and commu-
nication increase, a precisification of the actual needs and organizations for
advocating them require more and more articulate expression, and what role
extra-institutional practices have in such ongoing processes of articulation.
Addams’ insight in the relatively elementary structures behind this might help
vindicate her not only as a historically admirable figure and an important
contributor to the tradition of pragmatist thought, but also as an important con-
tributor to proper conceptions of world peace and the understanding of certain
phenomena in the organization of public will formation.
1. Addams on the content, function and political consequences
of new ideals
In her famous essay Newer Ideals of Peace, Jane Addams sets out, in her words,
to «present the claims of the newer, more aggressive ideals of peace, as over
against the older dovelike ideal» (3). According to Addams, «these newer ideals
are active and dynamic, and it is believed that if their forces were made really
operative upon society, they would, in the end, quite as a natural process, do
away with war» (3). Given that the older ideals also aspired to do away with
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war, her claim is that the newer ideals would be more likely to succeed where
the older ideals fail their own aspirations. This could either mean that
the older ideas were wrong and need to be replaced, or that the newer ideals
are necessary conditions for peace left out in the older ideals, but not both.
In Newer Ideals, Jane Addams herself is not always clear which of the two options
she wishes to take. My following remarks will suggest that Addams’ work on
peace makes its most original contribution when we see her as completing
the traditional understanding of peace and continuing the agenda of explicat-
ing the possibility of a political obligation to seek lasting peace outlined by
authors like Kant. To set the stage, let me briefly outline the content and func-
tion, as well as the political consequences of the newer ideals.
The main content of the newer ideals is the development of a «cosmopolitan
interest in the wider affairs of humanity» (9), awareness of which grows natu-
rally under conditions of precariousness in which human beings «must shape
their life with some reference to the demands of social justice» (17) and thus
undergo «the discovery of a new vital relation —that of the individual to the
race» because the satisfaction of common needs «overcome[s] arbitrary bound-
aries» (19). Her paradigmatic examples of the contexts of the emergence of
affectively mediated associations that are indifferent to nationality or differ-
ences in culture are the spontaneous collective practices of self-help in the pre-
carious and multi-cultural innercity immigrant communities who are, by virtue
of this precariousness, «reduced to the fundamental equalities and human
necessities of human life itself» (14), the global effort for the elimination of
tuberculosis (24), the emergent mutualities and publicly financed retirement
funds in European countries and Australia (25), the emergence of interna-
tional union and labor movements as agents of collective bargaining (144,
217), the peasant movement against military service in Russia (232), as well
as the experience of women in wartime4 and the cooperative necessities in and
of what she calls «Bread Labor» (234)5.
The key functions of the newer ideals are basically two. First, they would
facilitate combining and harmonizing as much the affections for one’s fellows
within one’s historically given community and those for one’s fellow human
beings outside the community as they would enable harmonizing «our common
law» and international law (11). She claims that «until society manages to com-
bine the two we shall make no headway toward the newer ideals of peace»
(11). The claim is that, without increasing, supporting and taking as our
responsibility the solidary practices among ourselves and towards the people
in other nations, the older ideals do not improve the chances that nations and
people in situations of urgency, threat or need can come to regard war as the
4. Addams, Jane (1916). The Long Road of Women’s Memory. New York: MacMillan),
136-137, as well as 126, where she stresses the internationally shared and basic character
of the natural response to WWI on the part of the individual women in every country
who have to care for the consequences of total war.
5. This is, of course, the main theme in Bread and Peace in Times of War.
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most reasonable action to take. The second function of the new ideals would
be that of offering a source of pervasive social and, ultimately, universal human
affective resistance against the actions required for such reversals.
Consequently, the political commitment to these new ideals would entail
taking the empirical knowledge of «social conditions which make possible this
combination» (11) as a «foundation […] not in speculation but in action» (20)
for institutionalizing the cultivation of practical habits that produce, repro-
duce and explicitly manifest the public support and need for «solidarity of
emotion and action essential to the life of all» (12) by fostering and promot-
ing the emergence of interpersonal and trans-communitarian commitments
and affections6. In the long term, the social effects of harnessing natural soli-
darity in this way and making its production a matter of social and political
concern would tend to spread attitudes capable of revising the priorities of
policy-making by the «substitution of nurture for warfare» (26) and even «the
attainment of [an] all-absorbing passion for multiform life» (10) throughout
a «social order [that] would not suppress the least germ of promise, of growth
and variety, but would nurture all into full and varied life» (213).
Addams pits these newer ideals «against the old dogmatic peace» (7) and por-
trays her work as a criticism as much of «philosophers […who] have been the
first to sigh for negative peace which they declared would be eternal» (23) and
suffered from «the eighteenth-century tendency to idealization» (29), as of
institution-centered ideals of «universal peace» that are promoted by «inter-
national lawyers […who] formulate into codes the growing moral sense of the
nations» (7). Compared with the enthusiastic hopes for peace inspired by
the new ideals, she finds both «discouraging». After the short indication I gave
before, let me now consider with some more detail why Addams thinks this.
2. New Ideals: radical or supplementary to the old ones?
Some of Addams’7 readers suggest that this is her view because these older
ideals are static, abstract and remote from actually succeeding in what she calls
«extinguishing the possibility of battle» (7). Her point would be that the newer
ideals conflict with the older ideals. The conflict would be, as suggested in these
readings, that older ideals are merely moral, while Addams’ newer ideal is polit-
ical. A standard way of arguing the point might go like this: One of her main
contentions, that «social morality is developed through sentiment and action»
6. It seems apt that Addams would call this way of attending to the causes and politically
relevant contents of affectively constituted social movements at the sub-institutional level
a «new humanitarianism» and not, as some have suggested, a new communitarianism.
The resources she insists on are in fact exemplifications of the existence of a «gravitation
toward the universal» (17), which universality makes it obviously a candidate for yielding
reasons that are normatively relevant in moral and political deliberation. For a recent com-
munitarian reading of Addams, cf. Carroll and Fink (2007), lxi. More differentiated, see
Whiggs (2004).
7. Carroll and Fink (2007), xviii.
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(213), applied to the ideal of peace, would yield that the newer ideals portray
peace as a value developed through political action and its commitments, while
the old ideals would not, presumably because they would treat the ideal of
peace as the outcome of moral reasoning alone. In a neo-pragmatist Rortyan
vein, one could think that the contrast of new and old ideas is one between
seeking a change in our practices or ideas and seeking justification. Suppose
someone guided by the older ideas were one who seeks moral justification of
the peace-idea. Given the actual militarist workings of the real world, con-
templating the older ideal’s superior justification to that of the actually action-
guiding principles of politics would only allow one to passively accept that
political success in the real world is not available by what moral reason com-
mands. This would demonstrate the weakness of the older ideals, since it offers
good news for cynics and those called «realists» in political science because it
shows that moral reflection on international politics is nothing but mere ide-
alism with no political pull. In contrast, the argument would conclude, those
guided by the newer ideals would actively seek ways of «discovering social
bonds better fitted to our requirements» than warfare and understand their
work as targeted at propagandizing the exchange of militaristic and competi-
tive attitudes by a fascination with the rich and varied fabric of humanity and
the avid interest in others’ well-being. However suggestive and exciting, I think
that this reading cannot be right.
To begin with, this would require attributing a major incompetence with
her predecessors in peace theory to Jane Addams. Although I can only briefly
indicate this here, it was Kant himself, a representative of older ideals if any-
one is, who drew attention to the fact that the ideal of peace between nations
and among human beings irrespective of their national identity is a «task» with
no guaranteed outcome, such that we have to take it as our responsibility to
choose peaceful policies wherever possible. That this is so is relatively unsur-
prising, because the moral justification of peace and the moral inadmissibility
of war is, within Kant’s system, relatively obvious (and therefore barely men-
tioned in Perpetual Peace8): one cannot perform war without resorting to some
form of violence or coercion against the legitimate will of others. Secondly,
wars require enlisting persons as executioners of the precepts of military and
political strategies and ends that they usually do not choose or even have the
competence to influence. For both reasons, war is impossible without using
others as means, not at the same time as ends in themselves with their own
will and rights and therefore ruled out directly by the second formulation of the
categorical imperative to use others never only as means alone, but to consid-
er them always as ends in themselves. Recognizing a prohibition to want war
as a moral ideal and thus the intention to avoid war as morally obliging or at least
a moral ideal is therefore boring to the degree of almost not requiring further
thought or justification. According to Kant’s arguments, this covers our plans
8. Kant, Immanuel (1991a). Political Writings (ed. by Hans Reiss). Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 93-130.
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and considerations directly at least with regard to so-called wars of aggression,
but in light of the instrumentalization of soldiers and the tacit calculation of
«collateral damages» to civilians Kant also mentions, probably most wars what-
soever. What Kant clearly saw is that it is the justification of peace as a legiti-
mate political ideal that has to answer questions because of the long history
of structuring international relations by means of war and armed threat and
the attendant skepticism for the possibility of peace.
It was also Kant who gave an excellent reason how someone might argue suc-
cessfully that seeking peace, while demanded by moral principles, is not nec-
essarily a political obligation: if peace were impossible (i.e., utopian), then there
could not be an obligation to produce it9. Suppose, for example, it turned out
that «war is in human nature» just as reason is; then, according to Kant, there
might be a moral ought, but not a possible obligation to seek peace. Seeking
peace would be, rather, a matter of moral heroism. For Kant, this possibility is
a special case of a general fact about moral freedom: if it is true that we are
moral beings only because we are free to act out of the recognition of the man-
dates of moral laws that we rationally acknowledge, then, as those same free
agents, we can also decide in fact to not follow these same mandates. This is so
simply because as free agents acting according to moral laws, it has to be true
of us that we might have done otherwise every time we did in fact aim at real-
izing the moral law. The possibility of radical evil in nature is thus the flipside
of Kant’s notion of moral autonomy10. This is far from a demonstration that
warfare is a part of human nature, but it is sufficient to show that Kant was
neither naive nor unaware of the need to make a case for the possibility of
peace in a two-part argument: a) against the impossibility-claim involved in
the radical evil alternative, and b) in favor of a political, i.e., action-demand-
ing obligation to seek peace.
The argument in Kant’s Perpetual Peace (and the rest of his political phi-
losophy11) consequently aims at establishing why the historical record cannot
offer conclusive proof of such an impossibility, at illustrating what in the his-
torical record offers evidence for the ability of human beings and nations to
effectively pursue peaceful international relations, and how the institutional
structures would have to be set up to make such achievements last. The key
to Kant’s proposed solution is to show that the historical record is not telling
because it does not establish an incompatibility between the moral demand for
peace and the conditions of political decision-making. Moreover, it also does
not establish that peace is unlikely when finally seriously pursued and human-
ity equips itself with adequate national and international institutions, such as
9. Cf. Perpetual Peace.
10. Paul Guyer has made this exemplarily clear in Guyer (2006), 294-303.
11. Mainly, «On the Common Saying “This May Be True in Theory, but it Does Not Apply in
Practice”». In: Kant, Immanuel (1991b). Political Writings (ed. by Hans Reiss). Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 61-92; «Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose».
In: Kant, Immanuel (1991c). Political Writings (ed. by Hans Reiss). Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 41-52.
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the global extension of self-government, international laws based on legiti-
mation by the principles of liberty and justice that also legitimize the nation-
al laws, and a cosmopolitan regime of individual rights towards any whatever
state irrespective of citizenship. Since humanity has not yet been observed
under such favorable circumstances, the alleged empirical generalization that
there have been no periods in the history of mankind without war cannot
establish a connection between human nature and warfare, but only between
human nature under strained, unjust and oppressive conditions and warfare.
It was Kant’s basic idea that under the abolition or at least reduction of such con-
ditions, peace would not only become much more likely than in the past, but
also, on the whole, much more likely than war.
In fact, Kant’s awareness of the obstacles was so keen that he famously
called for a set of institutional structures and manners of enforcement of the
mandates of global justice that «even a population of devils» would, through
their actions according to the corresponding regulations, finally end up pro-
gressing towards lasting global peace12. Kant also observed what we today are
perhaps more sorely aware of than he could ever have been, i.e., he observed that,
while a unified international legal order in the form of a global republic would
be «the only rational form» of abolishing war between nations in which nations
subject themselves to the verdict of humanity at large about their political
actions and decisions13, such a regime could not be hoped for and would
encounter legitimation problems as long as «the people don’t seem to want it»14.
Thus, it would have to be the «mechanism of nature», captured in the right
kind of regulations of behavior, that produces, as it were, behind the backs of
the agents, an ever more peaceful condition of humankind.
It is for this very reason that Kant comes to defend two very important
claims regarding the realizability of progress towards peace (which, as we saw,
is needed to make the moral norm politically obliging). On the one hand,
since a population of devils that does not want international cooperation
would also choose war if the decision-making procedures of their communi-
ty were maximally democratized, Kant rejects «bottom-up» approaches as
dangerous and counterproductive15. On the other hand, since most politi-
cians and leaders would rather tend to improve their own fate in stead of that
of humanity, even the «top-to-bottom» procedures of re-structuring the indi-
vidual nation states and later the cooperative structures between them in terms
of a cosmopolitan federation of states would require to broaden the political
decision-making procedures in a particular way: namely, philosophers or moral
12. Kant, Immanuel (1991a), 112-113.
13. Ibid., 105.
14. Ibid., 105.
15. Ibid., 117-118, where he states that a state «will gradually come to the stage where (...) the
people can be influenced by the mere idea of the law’s authority» (118). The future tense here
betrays Kant’s mistrust in progress driven by the people as they are. Without the instruction
of «moral politicians», the people might as well, he suggests, not reach this stage of sub-
jecting self-interest to moral insight and what is right.
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experts would have to become the «guiding voice» of what he called «moral
politicians»16.
Given this temporary help from the top, and given incrementally pro-
gressing democratic reforms, expecting peace and making it one’s responsibil-
ity to work on its realization is nonetheless not unreasonable because, accord-
ing to Kant,
a) in democratic procedures in which those who take the risks make the
decisions, the decision to go to war would be unlikely17,
b) the increasing prevalence of conflict-solutions by way of negotiated and
mutually agreed non-violent means would make war less and less attrac-
tive18, and
c) the increasing legally regulated commerce and intercourse among peo-
ple of different nations with possibly conflicting interests would spread
the respect towards people of different cultures and nationalities19.
Kant’s basic idea was this: (only) if humanity embarked on a history of
policies of progressive global juridification and democratization, and (only)
if humanity became habituated to civilized forms of conflict resolution first
on a national, and then progressively on a trans-national level, peace could be,
even would have to be the outcome20.
So, if one of the most prominent representatives of old ideals already
argued that the ideal of peace is political and not moral, and that demand-
ing peace requires a commitment to social progress (even though Kant’s own
account is clearly blind to the dangers of imperialism and colonialism21),
then attributing exactly the same point to Addams as her main achievement
must either attribute a blunder to her or miss the novelty of her «new ideals».
The same is true of interpretations that regard Addams’ indubitable com-
mitment to «critical pragmatism» in the sense of a stress on such tenets as
«the centrality of education, democracy, and the achievement of economic and
social equality»22 or on «social progress through mutual agreement and tap-
ping into communal intelligence»23 as the source of originality for her new
ideals. In light of Kant’s quite sophisticated conception, identifying such
16. Ibid., 117-124.
17. Ibid., 100.
18. Ibid., 104, where Kant explains that, once some pair of republics is joined by a peaceful
accord, then this model spreads until all republics are part of a global federation. The rea-
son for this is, according to the passage, that the peoples themselves see the advantages and
appreciate the superior rationality of «joining right and politics».
19. For a critical analysis of these Kantian theses, cf. Habermas (1996), 199-208; for an excel-
lent discussion of the problems for Kant’s thesis of «democratic peace» and other aspects
of his peace theory, see Kleingeld, Pauline (2006).
20. Cf. Kant, Immanuel (1991a), First supplement, where Kant somewhat emphatically writes
«Nature irresistibly wills that right should eventually gain the upper hand» (113).
21. McCarthy, Tom (2009), ch. 2, 5, 6.
22. This is Jo Deegan’s view as aptly summarized in MacMullan (2001), 93.
23. Cf. Hamington (2007), §4.
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commitments as central for explicating the ideal of lasting peace must seem
old hat.
I would therefore suggest against this popular radical reading of Jane
Addams’ contribution to peace-studies that her impatience with old ideals is bet-
ter interpreted as the expression of the view that, while the older ideals and
practices guided by them like moral reflection and international negotiations
and the juridification of international relations are necessary conditions for
making peace possible, they are not and cannot be sufficient as a foundation
for the defense of an effective political ideal of peace as a guiding principle of
real politics24. This reading is also more faithful to Addams’ own modesty, as
it is expressed in frequent remarks to the effect that «the newer humanitari-
anism […] substitutes emotional stimuli as well as codes of conduct»25 and in
the way in which she explicitly presents her work on peace as a contribution
to an existing and emergent political infrastructure aimed at guaranteeing
peace. Thus, she delineates the scope of her claims as follows:
assuming that the […] lines of appeal […] to sensibility […] and […] pru-
dence will persist, and that the international lawyers […] will continue to for-
mulate into codes the growing moral sense of the nations, the following pages
hope to […] point out the development of […] newer social forces which […]
will at last […] extinguish battle at its source26.
I take for granted that Addams did not think that we could guarantee de
facto the extinction of hostilities among nations by merely adopting her new
ideals. The extinction of battles she reclaims is rather a question of conceptu-
al coherence: it is only once we have fully appreciated the conditions under
which peace is possible in their entirety that the conception we have then
developed deserves to be called one of peace (as opposed, say, to minimally
violent long-term conflict-management, or highly armed stand-offs that increase
the mutual risks when broken). Only armed with such an improved under-
standing of what we have to commit to when accepting the normative author-
ity of the ideal of peace would we then be in a position to design better poli-
cies to actually obtain it. Addams’ claim is then that the older ideals do not
24. In fact, her use of the non-violent practices of spontaneous mutual help in precariousness
developed among poor and marginalized inner-city immigrants from all sorts of national-
ities and cultures, practices in which such differences fade away under the evidence of the
equality under the problems to be solved as paradigmatic of the presence of newer ideals
that warrant raised expectations for the prospects of peace is most compelling when we see
it as deepening and expanding Kant’s defense of the contention that peace is not only moral-
ly mandatory but also empirically possible among people of different nationalities. The
argument is straightforward: if peace is a moral ought, and if every political ought implies
an empirical can, then the demonstrable existence of non-violent practices of conflict-res-
olution and the satisfaction of basic needs that don’t even take note of national or cultur-
al boundaries supports the contention that the concern for peace is not just a moral but
also a political obligation, since it is false that it is empirically impossible.
25. Addams (2007), 26.
26. Ibid., 7.
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offer a satisfactory account of the full significance and normative entailments
of the ideal of peace because, without adding the new ideals, these concep-
tions are still compatible with the rational expectation (or even the tacit accep-
tance) of an arbitrarily large number of armed conflicts27.
If we take this line, then Addams’ newer ideals supplement or complete
moral and institution-centered conceptions of peace by elements without
which these conceptions alone don’t adequately capture the actual normative
commitments we have to accept when we conceive of a genuinely peaceful
global human condition. The question is then, given the older ideals’ content,
what exact substantive contribution Addams’ reflections make to an improved
or deepened understanding of the significance of the ideal of peace that we do
not get from the older ideals as delineated in Kant. But before we can address
this question, we need to see what exactly the problem of the institutionalist
enlightenment ideal is that Addams’ approach is to help us first identify and then
solve.
3. The problem of the old ideals: no lasting peace
To answer this question, we need to come back to what Addams regards as the
second function of the newer ideals, namely that they should offer an addi-
tional affective obstacle against war to the political decision between war and
peace, assuming that the institutionalization of structures such as those described
in Kant’s ideal is in place. As I will try to outline later, the particular phe-
nomena that Addams identifies as practical manifestations of a basic com-
mitment to peace, as well as her appeal to the normative structures underlying
nurturing as opposed to warrior practices mentioned before indeed enable us
to discern a further dimension of the ideal of peace that Kant’s conception of
peace virtually overlooks. But why does Addams see the need for such a com-
plement? In what sense is the enlightenment conception of lasting peace defec-
tive or incomplete as a unique concept of peace? In other words: admittedly the
enlightenment ideal is focused on institutional and legal aspects of a possible
global peace regime and thus leaves many aspects of international relations
(like trade, cultural exchange, tourism, etc.) to one side, but why would it
be necessary to pay attention to other relationships of an affective nature like
the solidary practices Addams seems so keen on? In what sense are they more
significant than as a display of a type of admirable, affection-based but
non-required generosity?
27. Attributing this position to Addams immediately undermines the «realist» criticism of the
expectations for peace raised by Addams’ new ideals as having been disproved by the bar-
barism of WWI and WWII and the de-humanizing forms of warfare of the 20th century
from nuclear war to ethnic cleansing (cf. Elshtain 2002, esp. 217ff.). Given that Addams’
point is to reveal the importance of additional conditions on possible peace, facts about
war only show that much less than what is needed has been accomplished in politics or
that we have not been very successful at the global level to live up to our ideals.
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At a decisive point in Newer Ideals of Peace, Addams observes that a peace
regime founded merely on a «common moral consciousness» (and we could
add, in light of her inclusion of international laws and agreements, a common
legal world order) is exposed to the constant threat that «reversion to […] brute
struggle may at any moment cost the destruction of the painfully acquired […]
ties of mutual principle, which are wrought with such effort and loosed with
such ease» (23), such that no constant progress towards an increase of peace-
ful relations can be rationally expected. Kant’s conception of peace specifies
the political realization of liberty and justice in the form of legal institutions that
are able to universally guarantee both as necessary for the gradual emergence
of a global peace regime. What Addams’ realizes is that, unless consciousness
of the demands of justice and liberty is supplemented by the politically effec-
tive use and development of informal and affective resources like solidarity
and an uncompromising commitment to and identification with cooperative
non-violent problem-solving as the unique means of settling conflicts, human-
ity might be successful at designing democratic national and international
institutions and yet not have come closer to living under peaceful conditions28.
If this were true, then it is clear in what sense the purely institutionalist enlight-
enment ideal is defective. Since the complete satisfaction of all the constraints
it imposes on international relations is compatible with persisting warfare, it can-
not count as what it claims to be, namely a conception that uniquely speci-
fies what it is for global conditions to be peaceful. The question is whether
Addams is right. To consider this question, it is useful to distinguish between
two dimensions in which Addams places the new ideals —that is, the affec-
tive relations and potentials she vindicates as indispensable complements
to the enlightenment ideal— to play a decisive role.
On the one hand, she endows these relations with the theoretical task to
develop a better theoretical concept of peace. In particular, she claims they
are needed as additional components in the analysis of international relations
to dispel the problem of utopianism, viz., that peace cannot be politically
obliging because it is, as a matter of fact, impossible. At this theoretical level,
the attitudes, affections and relationships she averts to serve her as indis-
28. That this is behind the problem I just quoted becomes clear when we add her apparently
skeptical observation that «it remains to be seen whether or not democratic rule will dimin-
ish war», since, precisely when popular sovereignty is exercised under militaristic or success-
by-elimination-of-competitor based cultural conditions, «it becomes easy to deny the moral
basis of self-government and to substitute militarism». She concludes that, for democrati-
cally constituted social conditions to count as seeking peace, «this attitude must disappear».
It is quite remarkable that an author who was writing these lines in 1907, under the impres-
sion of general enthusiasm of the power of democratically constituted nations like the US,
France and the British Empire to conquer the world and, nominally, acquire the ability to
«democratize» the imperialistically added territories, that such an author already then was
clear-sighted enough to discern the grave dangers and conceptual shortcomings of what
political scientists much later would call the (erroneous) idea of «democratic peace», which
many take (erroneously) as, e.g., Kant’s main argument. For a discussion of this with respect
to Kant, cf. Kleingeld (2006).
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pensable additional evidence against this impossibility-claim and in support
of the expectation of possible peace. To the degree that these attitudes suc-
cessfully supply such evidence, and the expectation of peace remains unlike-
ly without them, the practices in which these attitudes are articulated become
tangible as indispensable additional elements of any ideal set of conditions
that could, for all we know, sustain lasting peace. Theoretically, Addams’ new
ideals aim at showing why peace is not impossible if the affective and solidary
relations she calls attention to are acknowledged as part our conception of
peace.
On the other hand, as we saw, Addams also claims an important role for the
new ideals at the practical-political level of making and legitimizing decisions
between war and peace, and therefore for the pursuit of policies aimed at estab-
lishing a lasting global peace-regime. Her argument here is this: Given that
the traditional conception views mutual agreements and legally codified rela-
tions as the only constitutive condition for non-violent international relations,
breaches of such agreements and relations yield a prima facie legitimation for
assuming non-non-violent reactions, that is, for the use of force to coerce com-
pliance. But this is, as Addams’ quote shows, equivalent to giving war and the
use of force the status of a default option for political decision-making in cases
of international conflict. Going to war, as opposed to attempting non-violent
conflict resolution, is de facto treated as the standard option not in need of
special legitimation. At the practical-political level, it is therefore of paramount
importance for the success of actually pursuing peace to uncover additional
reasons that counterbalance this bias in favor of the use of force or even are
able to permanently remove it from its position as the option of choice in case
of conflict. Addams accordingly is at pains to portray her new ideals at sup-
plying additional political resources in favor of non-violent management of
international conflicts. In the long term, the ability to continuously appeal to
these resources by political decision-makers ought to help replace the war-bias
of the traditional conceptions by its opposite. Being available to citizens and
decision-makers, adequate attention to the beliefs, values and attitudes embod-
ied in solidary practices seems to Addams to amount to offering a fountain
of rational resistance against decisions to go to war that is erroneously left aside
by reliance on stated opinions of citizens as the standard form of possibly deci-
sion-making reasons.
It is instructive to distinguish Addams’ point here from sheer idealism,
with which Addams’ position has occasionally been associated or even con-
fused29. The normative point of the seemingly practical concern within
Addams’ view is fairly obvious. Should it turn out that the ideal of peace thus
29. Elshtain (2002) is a representative of this tendency. For a recent, more differentiated appre-
ciation of the complexities of Jane Addams’ own developmental progressivism that accounts
for, while also relativizes and correctly situates whatever may appear «idealist» in her phi-
losophy of peace as ultimately naturalistic in opposition to a problematic idealism such as
Kropotkin’s, cf. Eddy, Beth (2010).
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augmented does, while the old ideal does not at least cohere with, or even
warrant the expectation of generalized peaceful conflict management, then it fol-
lows that, if we ought to seek peace (as the agreed upon moral standpoint
demands), then we ought to foster, support, legally protect and furnish the
means to perform the solidary practices. Solidary action becomes an imputable
part of whatever moral ideal is at the basis of our commitment to peace. Thus,
Addams’ appeal to attention to such practical realizations of «humanism» is
in fact a pointer to implied obligations, not to good-will or even the good in
human nature. She dismisses policy proposals based solely on the dubitable fact
of sane human feelings as «sentimentalism», which dismissal we ought to take
extremely seriously even if it appears confusing at first in a philosopher who
so much insists on the systematic role that emotions and affectively articu-
lated attitudes play in justification and conception30. Addams takes these prac-
tices and their content as data for the missing normative substance, i.e., the
rights of those benefiting from the outcomes of solidary activities, the insti-
tution of which is as mandatory as the institution of the already recognized
«human rights» if international organizations are to be expressive of a com-
mitment to peace remains mere lip-service for being based on an incoherent
conception.
Let me now consider whether Addams is right on each of the levels I
mentioned: whether conceptually the enlightenment ideal is compatible with
persistent use of force, and whether politically, it incorporates a systematic bias
in favor of the use of force. We saw that Addams identified the problem for
the enlightenment ideal that the complete satisfaction of all the constraints
it imposes on international relations is compatible with persisting warfare.
When we follow Addams in making use of the probabilistic and interaction-
analytic framework developed in the pragmatist tradition to unpack the
mutual expectations that are warranted under the conditions established by
the enlightenment ideal, both of her points quickly become evident31. For, as
30. Thus, I believe it at best preliminarily useful to subsume Jane Addams under philosophical
agendas that stress the emotional against the rational articulation of practical attitudes, as
can often be found in the feminist literature that favorably reacts to her work. In our con-
text, one example of such an approach can be found in Poe, Danielle (2008).
31. Admittedly, Addams seems to smudge matters in many places by merely exploiting the
pragmatist genetic account of the role of practices in canvassing social sentiments as effec-
tive reasons in decision making. Thus, she repeatedly insists that the moral code grew out
of solidarity and emotion» (12), or «that in the progress of society sentiments and opin-
ions have come first, then habits of action and lastly moral codes» (8). But that would not
clarify how moral sentiments could act as rational impediments once the reflective stage of
decision-making by weighing reasons is reached. Unless we are given rational constraints
on decision-making that are more stringent than those explicated in traditional theories
(or «older ideals») of peace, we cannot come to understand why Addams’ newer ideals
should make it more reasonable to expect a progress to peace. After all, in acquiring the
ability to make reflective and reasoned decisions, people can override all sorts of feelings,
so why should solidary feelings not be capable of being overridden by presumed insights
in the way the real world works in the same way as, say, hostility to large men is overridden
by the insights in the irrelevance of stature to moral character?
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long as civic and international relations are seen as based merely on the trust
evidenced by mutual agreements and the shared acceptance of common laws,
possible breaches of such agreements directly and irreversibly offer direct
evidence against the attribution of a commitment to these institutionalized
social relations to the other party. In such cases, and on the (theoretical)
assumption that mutual agreements are the only constitutive condition for
presuming social responsibility to others or other communities, the (practical-
political) rational basis for the belief that oneself or one’s community has
any ties, duties or cooperative responsibilities from relating to the other is
undermined. Under the disappearance of mutual trust, however, the other
is under this model demoted to the status of a natural threat, which may, if
it appears to be efficient, warrant military action. In any event, the evidence
in question always supports decisions in favor of the use of force as legiti-
mate, given that only agreements could present demonstrative evidence indict-
ing them. This is equivalent to taking the use of force as the default legitimate
option in cases of broken or unavailable agreements. The older, institution-
based ideals therefore face the problem of explaining how it is reasonable to
expect progress to peace and how, once decision-makers have run out of rea-
sons based on existing and followed agreements by other nations, non-vio-
lent actions can be rationally legitimized against instrumentally more effi-
cient competing courses of action that imply the use of force. Just as Addams
observes, this challenges the institutionalist conception of peace at the the-
oretical level because the evidence from interaction-constraints it admits is not
sufficient to exclude the rational, pervasive and persistent choice of policies
of using force against other nations in case of conflicts. It challenges the
older ideal at the practical-political level because in construing contingent
breaches of agreements by other nations as sufficient reason to justify the use
of force, this ideal places systematically higher burdens of proof on the polit-
ical defense of non-violent solutions and thus promotes if anything, then
not the pursuit of peace, but the acceptance of the use of force. Addams’
claim that the older ideal of peace is conceptually and politically incomplete
thus seems well motivated. In this sense, she is also right in saying that it
cannot count as offering a full grasp of the significance of the full range
of entailments of the ideal of peace. The key point in this argument is to
re-direct the focus from moral foundations to interactional biases (a very
typically pragmatist movement), and then to show that the normative sig-
nificance of the concept of peace is not exhausted by fully spelling out its
moral and juridical foundations. Even if we granted Kant, as the representative
of old ideals, to have achieved the latter, there would still be a need for new
ideals to solve the problem of the irreversibility of breakdowns in peaceful
conflict resolution.
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4. Practically articulated New Ideals: a sample solution
to a practical-political problem of older ideals
Let me now turn to the question what exactly the contribution of Addams’
new ideals to an improved understanding of the entailments of a commitment
to a genuine ideal of peace is. How can the solidary practices and affective atti-
tudes articulated in them complete moral and institution-centered concep-
tions of peace? Given that it is evidence for demonstrating that the alleged fac-
tual impossibility of peace is a figment, I first want to explain how Addams’
appeal to practices of tendentially global solidarity and the affective resources
that are articulated in them helps to reveal political reasons for the view that even
societies at war have to favor in fact by necessity non-violent conflict-resolution
over the use of force against other nations. To repeat, her argument here is
that practical (as opposed to, say, transcendental) conditions sometimes are
able to constrain normative decisions and deliberations by the fact that fol-
lowing the (proposed, or alleged) norms (like the permission to use force as a
means of politics) requires the satisfaction of these conditions in the first place.
In this limited sense, her argument excavates practically «prior» conditions, in
this case, inevitably peaceful and cooperative conditions at the basis of norms
the realization of which entails military activities. If such conditions are required
for the successful performance of military activities, then it is wrong to assume
that mere breaches of agreements by other nations alone already offer suffi-
cient reasons for the use of force to coerce compliance, because there remain
many other relationships of (required, even if not realized as such, for whatever
ideological and propagandistic reasons) mutual solidarity among the citizens
of these nations. It is incorrect, according to Addams, to take the breakdown
of institutionalized agreements as a sufficient reason to permit war (because
peace would be impossible otherwise) because in addition, there are commit-
ments on the side of each of the potentially warring parts that are articulated
in the nurturing practices that are even required by the functioning of the
armies, and these commitments are shared by those whose needs are satisfied
by the performance of these practices —that is, by the citizens of both nations.
Therefore, even if there is a disagreement or even a breakdown of agreements,
it is not the case as if there were no entitlement to being treated and respect-
ed as someone needing nurture and care on the side of the citizens. Such enti-
tlement, in turn, could be sufficient to trump the considerations that support
the alleged entitlement to go to war.
I want to exemplify Addams’ point with a view on practices of produc-
ing nurture and care that occupied the better part of her post WWI theorizing,
Peace and Bread in Time of War32. Her argument is as simple as it is com-
pelling. According to the institutionalist ideal, given a breach of an agree-
ment and assuming that this is equivalent to the absence of mutual obliga-
tions, war is permissible to coerce compliance. In case of a chance for a nation
32. Addams, Jane (1945).
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to win more from another nation in a war than by any negotiated solution,
the institutionalist conception of peace is compatible with the conclusion
that it is sometimes more advantageous to respond with war to breaches of
agreements than in terms of non-violent solutions. Indeed, the institutionalist
ideal even allows identifying certain conditions in which, under observation
of all constraints the ideal imposes, war is (ceteris paribus) rationally the uniquely
best political action. Since this decision covers all the available relevant reasons,
it has to count as legitimate, too. On this background, Addams argues as fol-
lows: for every war, it is a necessary empirical condition that each of the fight-
ing parts of the population in the warring nations be provided with basic
goods like nutrition and healthcare, because as soldiers, they do not con-
tribute to the production of basic goods like bread and shelter. Thus, where
there is war, it presupposes ongoing non-violent and cooperative practices
of nurture and care by the non-fighting parts of the population (at the time,
mostly women). The decision for using force and non-cooperative conflict
resolution thus always presupposes sustenance by a broader and in fact more
prevalent background of non-violent, co-operative practices and values that are
sensitive to the needs of others in virtue of their being all equally vulnerable.
Moreover, given the similarity of nutritional and healthcare needs among
members of different nations, the corresponding activities and thus the pur-
poses, values and beliefs involved in these productive practices are by and
large the same in all nations who are involved in armed conflict. Thus, wherever
there is war, there necessarily is a large set of shared beliefs, values and non-
violently articulated nurturing attitudes and problem-solutions on the part
of all the non-fighting parts of the nations involved in this war. Therefore,
the decision to go to war always necessarily rests on a tacit background of
actually existing, functioning and ongoing relationships of objectively shared
concern and purposes between the individual members of warring nations in
point of satisfying the basic needs of the fighting and the non-fighting parts
of each population. Hence, any defense or legitimation of going to war as
opposed to attempting non-violent solutions can never count as a demonstra-
tion of war as the uniquely best and most essential policy of a given community
if it is not at the same time a defense of the de facto common practices articu-
lating trans-nationally shared basic interests. As a consequence, it is simply
false to regard the use of force as default-legitimate in case of breaches of agree-
ments once we pay attention to the practices that are sensitive to and built
around the production of nurture and care for those in need. We might as well
take the objectively existing and practically articulated and expressed shared
needs as a basis for the opposite decision. Likewise, and for the same reason,
it is also simply false to regard relations based on explicit and legally codifiable
relations as the only relevant relations among nations considered as compounds
of individuals with such needs as are at issue in the corresponding practices.
A possible objection to this line of reasoning from what is known as the
«realist» standpoint in political science actually helps to enhance and general-
ize its point. The objection is this: How about going to war in order to supply
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food for one’s own population in a situation where such supply would be pos-
sible without war as well but, in the view of the government, more costly, or
more difficult to organize (e.g., with an unwilling population)? Suppose, that
is, that going to war is, in the view of those with the authority to make the
decision between war and peace, less costly overall than to provide the social ser-
vices by peaceful means. Wouldn’t the bias for care and nurture likewise favor
war in this case? In response, let us suppose for a moment that this is in fact true
in a given case, and based on sound accounting (which is, at least for the usual
case, false). Even so, this scenario serves to show that even such a «war of the
hungry» presupposes that there exists, somewhere, a functioning, non-violent,
productive set of cooperative relations for the production of food, healthcare,
etc. «Non-violent» does not, incidentally, mean that it has to be «voluntary»,
as commissioned war production illustrates. But even this requires more than
military equipment and practices. You can’t eat guns and bombed terrain. The
simple fact is that, for there to be food at all somewhere, there cannot be war
everywhere. Thus, it is impossible to generalize the relevant policy recom-
mendation («whenever you need nurture, go to war»), since universal warfare
and nurture are pragmatically incompatible. But, and this is the important
point, the reverse is coherent. Universal nurturing cooperation is a coherent
ideal, and as such, it already underlies a great many «naturally occurrent» prac-
tices (i.e., we don’t need to invent anything here). It thus forms a de facto
default position even for those societies that decide to go to war, even though
it may not be recognized as such by the decision-making processes. By way of
this asymmetry, Addams’ argument is able to demonstrate (in a next-to-tran-
scendental fashion) why the militarist bias cannot be sustained but must always
count as parasitic, or at least exceptional.
Given the content and paradigmatic examples of Addams’ newer ideals
mentioned before and the problem of the older problems just outlined, we
can now see the basic idea behind the claim that raising our expectations with
regard to lasting peace requires attention to affective elements in the process
of political decision-making. It arises out of the second function of newer
ideals, that of offering a source of pervasive social and, ultimately, universal
human affective resistance against the actions required for the reversals that
hold our expectation of lasting peace based on the resources of the older ideals
of peace hostage. The acknowledgment of the content expressed in beliefs, val-
ues, attitudes and deliberate actions involved in nationality-neutral, topic-
oriented solidary practices as described by Addams’ «New Ideals» would, as it
were, further peace by adding to moral and legal beliefs and international
agreements an element of aversion against violence and warfare. These prac-
tices articulate, as their content, compound affective wholes that sustain each
of these practices, and which are responsive to and thereby implicitly acknowl-
edging and endorsing shared basic human needs in each community. Making
these needs available to decision making would enable an awareness of such an
aversion by giving those engaged in these practices and the affectively encoded rela-
tionships among populations proper hearing in deliberations. In this sense, Addams’
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insistence on the importance of paying attention to these practices reckons
with, but also adds to the necessary condition of stably peaceful transnation-
al relations that Kant identified as the global adoption of democratic proce-
dures; what this attention adds are standard constraints without which these
necessary conditions are not genuinely advancing the cause for peace. For only
once such dispositions were accorded their proper weight in political decision-
making, war would not just be the least efficient, most risky and most waste-
ful and the least morally desirable option (although Addams assents to all of the
above, too) but at the outset the least plausible. In this way, proper attention
and promotion of empirically existing solidary practices and their objective
sources in trans-nationally shared needs and granted individual entitlements
(such as to food, shelter and healthcare) would enable the recognition of pre-
viously disqualified reasons —being also even if not foremost implicit acknowl-
edgments of rights of those whose needs these practices addressed— and prac-
tically expressed and thereby universally accessible evidence in decisions between
war and peace. Given that what these formerly unattended reasons exploit are
non-violent coordinative structures and values that are presupposed by any real-
ization of war, invoking the existence of such empirically necessary conditions
of life in war and peace, and demonstrating actual collective commitments to
their moral significance by pointing to ongoing solidary practices rationally
should revise the bias in favor of the use of force that was built into the impov-
erished conception of international and social relations of the institutionalist
ideal.
5. How affective attitudes contribute to a solution of the theoretical 
problem of older ideals
With these considerations regarding the justificatory function of the back-
ground of affective attitudes towards others as fellow human beings in place,
the solution to the theoretical problem left over by the institutionalist con-
ception is almost obvious. As mentioned before, the theoretical task of Addams’
emphasis on solidary practices and the affective attitudes they articulate is to
supply additional constraints to this conception of peace that warrants the
assumption that peace is not impossible, in order to develop a concept of glob-
al peace that is incompatible with an arbitrary number of rational decisions
to resort to armed hostility and the systematically higher likelihood of war as
compared to peace. If these additional constraints were to succeed better in
delineating conditions that satisfy these requirements than the institutional-
ist view, then we could conclude that Addams’ additions are indeed an inte-
gral part of a concept of global peace. By showing that peace is not impossible
under the conditions required by this concept, Addams’ additional evidence
would also contribute to the defense of peace as a political obligation and spell
out what other commitments following this obligation entails.
As we saw in our discussion of the example of bread-work at the practical-
political level, Addams’ new ideals are to function as an obstacle to the inevitable
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degeneration of occasions of distrust into fight by complementing the trust
articulated by mutual agreements between nations and their governments by
something like the existing information about an affective, culturally encoded
bias against war that is relatively independently carried by a background of
primarily practical, local and informal relationships of concrete mutual concern.
Addams thus broadens, in typically pragmatist fashion33, the range of avail-
able information in reasoning, belief-formation, justification and decision
making from the contents that are available via articulate propositional beliefs
to those available in other forms of expression, like the performative achieve-
ments of actually ongoing interpersonal practices. Given this additional infor-
mation, even when we have reason to distrust other nations or individuals on
the level of propositionally articulated beliefs, we would still by default not
regard war as an option. Theoretically, this is equivalent to integrating the
information afforded by the existence of these practices, or even by their prac-
titioners into our estimates regarding the likely outcomes of the series of polit-
ical decision-making that makes up human history. In other words, it is equiv-
alent to correcting the implicitly assumed bias towards violent or at least not
peaceful conflict resolution that lead to the problems for the old ideals by
another, empirically and systematically prior bias or baseline34.
We can now present a probabilistic argument with the conclusion that was
theoretically needed, namely: that peace is not impossible, that contrasts the evi-
dence available to those who decide between war and peace in a given case
under attention to solidary practice and the evidence available without such
attention. If the population of potentially warring nations is made aware of
the beliefs presupposed in these solidary practices, and thus of the reasons
guiding their own actions as a society at large, then these beliefs can become a
(previously unattended) relevant deliberative factor in the choice between war
and peace. Now, insofar as society is the ultimate source of political decision-
making, that is, to the degree that political decision making is democratic,
these beliefs offer a previously unexploited resource of evidence against violent
conflict-management, or at least a resource of evidence that is independent of
the agreements and legal obligations accepted by the adoption of international
33. That Addams relies on the pragmatist background is indicated in her references to substi-
tuting «the scientific method of research for the a priori method of the schoolmen» (Addams
2007, 28), and that «the social point of view be kept paramount, realizing at the same time
that the social sentiments […] must be enlightened, disciplined and directed by the fullest
knowledge» (Addams 2007, 11).
34. Even so, I think it is taking things too far in this direction to attribute to Addams an antic-
ipation of so-called «standpoint-epistemologies» (as §3 of Hamington (2007) suggests),
but she certainly was after additional evidence that was suppressed in a male-dominated,
militaristically spirited mainstream culture. If the point of this attribution is to say that
Addams not only had a human concern, but extremely good and valid epistemological
arguments, then what I outline is further material for stressing this. Two Addams-inter-
preters who share my view that Addams’ peace-theory (as well as her theory of cultural
democratization) is best understood when taken as making a serious epistemic point are
MacMullan (2001) and Pratt (2004).
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conventions. Thus, in proportion to the prevalence of democratic decision-
making within each nation and to the awareness of reasons to act underlying
solidary practices among the people that would tip the balance against war,
the expected frequency of rationally considering war as an option in the case
of broken contracts is no longer close to 100%, as in the case where every
breach presented a breakdown of mutual obligations, but lower to the degree
that these other considerations are given their proper weight. Thus, in the case
of broken contracts, the overall probability of resorting to war decreases. Since
broken agreements are the most egregious instance of conflicts among nations,
the same reasoning applies to lesser conflicts as well. Therefore, an overall
increase in peace becomes more likely than under conditions in which the
main support for non-violent social and international relations is derived from
the behavior towards agreements.
In summary, notwithstanding much of her rhetoric, the real contribution
of Addams’ use of paradigmatic cases of solidary action to peace-theory is nei-
ther that of offering these practices themselves as models for international con-
duct (as if we could naively read off the solidarity within inner-city immigrant
colonies recipes for global politics)35. It is also not that of appealing to the
softness of heart and the moral sentiments that dwell supposedly beneath
the surface of aggressive and competitive behavior in industrialized capitalist soci-
eties. Her highly original contribution is rather that of discovering the epis-
temic role of the cognitive entailments of enacting moral sentiments in col-
lective practical and institutional ways of confronting social and economic
basic needs. By changing the focus from natural history as hoped for and
the participation of the wisdom of experts in moral philosophy in politics to the
microstructure of how history is made by spontaneous responses to actual and
universally recognizable human needs and precariousnesses and the contribu-
tion that local activists make to bringing them into the open by giving them
an articulation in the form of nation-blind, non-violent solidary practices
(which in due course can themselves become institutionalized), Addams dis-
covers the needed resistance to the problem of radical evil, or the rational
degeneration of breaches of agreements into the inevitable likelihood of armed
conflicts that threaten as much Kant’s as the institutionalist conception with
impossibility proofs for peace. Armed with this additional resource, she can
thus offer a coherent concept of peace, avoid the threat of inevitable degener-
ation and thus more successfully defend the view that it is a political obligation
and part of our moral point of view to seek peace.
35. This is the, correctly ridiculed, position attributed to Jane Addams’ use of her paradigms in
Elshtain 2002, 202, as well as 218-20. However, as Carroll and Fink in their criticism of Elsh-
tain in the «Introduction to the Illinois Edition» (2007) equally correctly observe, it is not
a position held by Addams (cf. lv-lx). My remarks give another reason why this also should
not be Addams’ stance.
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6. Consequences for our understanding of the ideal of lasting peace
The consequences of Addams’ often implicit arguments are threefold. They
concern a) rather technical philosophical lessons that align Addams’ thought
with ideas that we find in the pragmatist tradition, and, insofar as her writ-
ings predate the writings of other pragmatists, qualify her as anticipating these
thoughts, b) the conceptual coherence of the particular traditional under-
standings of the ideal of peace, and c) the structure of practical-political jus-
tification and evidence in making decisions between war and peace, as well as
in motivating the expectation of possible global increments of peaceful rela-
tions among nations. While a) is of mainly philosophical-historical interest,
b) and c) yield direct insights into political obligations accruing from a com-
mitment to peace as an ideal as well as elements of a political theory apt to
formulate better criteria for global peaceful conditions.
a) We saw that Addams sets out from the discovery of a serious flaw in the
explanation of the significance of the ideal of lasting peace along tradi-
tional, institution-based conceptions of international relations. In order to
appreciate Addams’ philosophical originality with regard to developing a
characteristically pragmatist approach to history and political justification,
it may be helpful to remind ourselves of the already quite well prepared
philosophical landscape in which her discovery is embedded. In spite of
Kant’s rejection of the definition of peace as the absence of armed hostili-
ties between nations, the content of the traditional ideal of peace remained
limited to the vision of a network of treatises and agreements among nation
states. However, it turns out that in cases of the mere possibility of breach-
es of agreements, it was conceptually difficult to understand the state of
affairs that would realize this vision as presenting a condition of lasting
global peace. Kant himself saw such a problem when considering the pos-
sibility of radical evil and attempting to put his conception of cosmopoli-
tanism on a footing that was apt to lead even a «people of devils» to a more
peaceful state of global affairs. According to him, if it is to be rational to
expect and to be obliged to work for peace, we have to add the anticipa-
tion of a natural history of progress and development towards peace. This
history would be driven by moral politicians whose political decision-mak-
ing is inclusive of and limited by the insights of philosophers who see
beyond the appearance of constant warfare and who are able to design and
carve out the right kinds of structures and agreements to break the legal
permissiveness regarding armed conflict. Only under these empirical con-
ditions would the moral ideal, when coupled with an institutionalized and
juridified set of cooperative agreements among individually democratized
nations, allow expecting the possibility of peace. But, as Kant clearly saw,
peace as an ideal can only be politically obliging if the latter expectation
is warranted, for only such an expectation (or an equivalent) undermines
the indirect justification of warfare as a means of international relations
that results from the consistent possibility of holding that peace might
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be a moral ideal but not a political obligation since, as a matter of fact, it
is not possible.
The important feature of this argument for understanding the point
of Addams’ reasoning is that it acknowledges in an oblique way that our
understanding of peace is not purely a priori, and that the content of the
concept —above all, the fact that it is not empty— is sensitive to the empir-
ical conditions under which it is applied. Addams’ reasoning can then be
understood as exercising typically pragmatist insights of two sorts: episte-
mological and conceptual. On the one hand, Addams’ very idea of recon-
structing, renewing and to a degree revising the «old ideal» itself carries the
pragmatist conviction on its sleeve that purported conceptual justifications
for actions, norms, decisions are sensitive to revisions in light of the empir-
ical conditions and consequences of their application. Such a position only
makes so much as sense if we accept that there is no belief, even if it is
either apparently or actually a priori, that could be assumed to be guaran-
teed not to come under critical appraisal and eventually rational revision
in light of experience, application, the empirical realization of what the
belief says. In our case, this would be the belief that whatever a priori moral
philosophy warrants as normative commitments of peace is all there is to
understanding what the required policies and actions are to be driving at.
On the other hand, in a related way Addams’ insistent and passionate inves-
tigation renders a brilliant example of the so-called pragmatic maxim, which
in this case would minimally imply that the content of the concept of peace
cannot be fully spelled out without reference to the practical consequences
that adopting it as a guiding principle for policy making has. For, it is in light
of the incoherence of these practical consequences that Addams is able to
discern that traditional, institution-based explications of the concept were
lacking a decisive further set of conditions, the conditions of peace-gener-
ating, or at least paradigmatically non-violent needs and practices of a
nation-blind sort, which could anchor structures of mutual commitments
even in the absence of, or under the breach of agreements. Thus, the other
typically pragmatist feature without which Addams’ arguments cannot be
understood is the assumption that conceptual content is sensitive to empir-
ical information, and thus the «meaning» of a concept neither fixed once
and for all, but also not fully determinable unless we add information about
the paradigmatic samples that fall under them, and the typical contexts in
which applying the concept would yield a correct statement. In our case,
the statement about world affairs, or the relations among two nations to the
effect that «nation A and nation B are at peace». Of course, it is then a
small step to argue that it is only knowing the meaning of the term «peace»
that we know, first, whether or not we are obliged to seek peace and second,
if we are so obliged, what counts as fulfilling our duties under this obliga-
tion, or at least trying to do so. One final but not entirely unimportant
pragmatist feature of Addams’ approach is her acknowledgment that propo-
sitionally structured, potentially verbalizable attitudes are not the only, and
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not the only relevant source of justificatorily relevant information even in
the arena of political decision making. Larger practical involvements of
collectively active individuals like food-aid work can articulate needs, just
as empathetically perceived pictures of suffering can correct the assump-
tion that everything is, as far as we see, well-ordered. But it is not only as
data that such affective attitudes are relevant, but, as we saw, also as a bias-
forming prior of decision-making. In both ways, cognitive units that are
either larger than propositions or smaller enter crucially into our normative
assessments. Counting such affective states as such as possible sources of
justificatorily relevant information is, if anything, the most fundamental
insight and plight of classical philosophical pragmatism.
b) With these rather technical aspects as a backdrop, it is now easy to see that,
as regards the conceptual analysis of the ideal of peace, Addams’ «New
Ideals» argue that this ideal offers a necessary, but not a sufficient condi-
tion of the circumstances under which lasting peace is to be expected. As
she sees, even under such conditions, there is a coherent possibility for an
arbitrary number of individually justifiable military confrontations from
minimal breaches of agreements. Thus, the very idea that such conditions
alone would allow the expectation of a continuous practice of international
peace becomes problematic. As soon as Kant’s «natural history» is viewed
as Addams sees it, as a series of political decisions and actions, at every
node of the decision tree making up the series, there is a non-zero proba-
bility of breaches of agreements, each one of which conceptually entails
the breakdown of non-violent relations and thus the possibility of justifi-
able warfare. In short, even equipped with the set of institutions and agree-
ments, as well as the expertise of philosophers in government, it is ratio-
nal to expect war to be much more likely than peace under the traditional
conception because of the inevitable presence of judgment-calls in a series
of interlocking decisions and interactions between nations that are con-
ceived of as individual agents. Now, if this were right, then Kant’s own rea-
soning that there cannot be a political ought where there is an empirical
impossibility would apply in probabilistic form. Given the high likelihood
of decisions to go to war that are nonetheless rationalizable under full obser-
vance of Kantian constraints, even if there is a moral ought, the attendant
expectation that a comprehensive and lasting global peace is possible comes
under the serious strain to appear highly utopian. By Kant’s own lights,
this immediately means that the corresponding political obligation to seek
peace is in trouble, too. In this way, the project to explain the content of a
politically obliging ideal of peace along traditional institutionalist lines
alone fails. Whence Addams’ thesis that, if any expectation of lasting peace
is to be warranted at all, additional moral, motivational and evidential
resources need to be integrated in the very conception of what conditions
are like that would allow the expectation of lasting global peace. In a way,
her arguments correct our understanding of what additional constraints
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we need to meet and work under when we commit ourselves to the moral
ideal of peace. Her «New Ideals» claim to identify some of these addition-
al resources and constraints, such as are expressed in what we would call
nowadays NGO-activism and other forms of spontaneous solidary action.
c) If we accept this reasoning and Addams’ conclusion, then we accept the
normative significance for the pursuit of the political obligation to seek
lasting inner and outer peace of spontaneously emerging, non-violent social
practices that are concerned with and receptive to the satisfaction of basic
needs. Their normative significance resides at least in part in their capac-
ity to bring to the fore otherwise suppressed and unattended reasons for
political action and for lacunae in our success of institutionally securing
that others are treated as equals. Another important part of their signifi-
cance stems from their particular structure of presenting nationality-blind
non-violent cooperations among individuals with shared needs, and thus
tend to undermine the simplifying assumption that modern, multi-ethnic
or at least multi-cultural nation states are individual collective agents,
instead of organized wholes of individuals whose needs and therefore also
entitlements to rights tend to transcend national boundaries quite easily.
Solidarity with respect to such basic needs of human beings as individual
organisms thus possesses a transnational tendency that the traditional con-
ception of international relations overlooks, as much as a potential to build
from as a reason-giving constraint on the justification of decisions to go
to war. In promoting peace, we therefore also ought to promote and vin-
dicate the conditions and successful pursuit of solidary action, as well as
the investigation of the grounds for the emergence of such practices. On the
one hand, the fact that such trans-national spontaneous solidary action
exists among people of varied nationalities and cultural backgrounds pre-
sents empirical counterevidence to the implicit presumption that, gener-
ally, war is the human reality where peace is a mere ideal. On the other
hand, the fact that the corresponding interactive commitments and affec-
tive structures of mutual assistance can be developed and, in certain cases,
are already in place on a sub-institutional, interpersonal level in the inter-
national context provides an, admittedly initially very small but potentially
incremental affective potential against violence upon those we are related
to as companions and fellow human beings, a potential that could amount
to enabling a continuation of non-violent conflict management even under
conditions of breaches of agreements. Promoting the voices of such extra-
governmental and sub-institutional agents is thus a much more significant
additional piece of information for the decision to go to war than Kant’s
dream of leaders being influenced by moral philosophers.
In a slogan, we could say that we are driven to recognize the insepa-
rable connection between support for the strife for social justice and egal-
itarian practices on the one hand, and the measure of an expectation of
success for our commitment to peace on the other. While it would be
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absurd to claim that every need articulated in a spontaneous non-violent
practice of mutual assistance in the satisfaction of this need constitutes
the germ of potential entitlement for humanity at large, it does not seem
absurd to say that it is only under optimally supported conditions of cul-
tural, social and economic development possible to excavate as many needs
as humanity can articulate. As Addams’ arguments teach us, we cannot
claim, by providing agreements and international regulations among
national governments, to have captured all the potential of whatever needs
might turn out to be universal and basic. In order to be closer to that
claim, there is an irreducible informative value to solidary practices for
judging which of the needs taken care of in them warrant the institution
of proper rights, namely the right of only suffering the need that the cor-
responding practice responds to if it is inevitable that every human being
suffers the same need in the same way. For very basic needs like food,
clothing and shelter, Addams has made that case, and has been heard by
a large community of peace theorists until today who include as a matter
of course policies of economic and social development in the catalogue
of the requirements for the pursuit of global peace36. If, as Kant argued,
the pursuit of lasting global peace is part and parcel of our moral point
of view, arguments like those of Jane Addams can show that this pursuit
is only coherent when the rights that are required by the procedures of
legitimation for legal norms are supplemented by all practical pursuits that
carry information about what the rights of each human being ought to
be. As we saw, without such added information, we are left with formu-
lating necessary but definitely insufficient reasons for believing that peace
is possible, and hence hostage to the militaristic bias that breaches of agree-
ments at the transnational level tend to directly justify military interven-
tion. Once we factor in the commitments articulated in solidary action,
breaches of agreements are not the last peaceful word and the first step
into violent confrontation. This is the positive, conceptual side of her
arguments. However, this also clearly serves to show that our commit-
ment to peace, which stems from our commitment to the moral point of
view, is not as cheap as traditionally thought. This is the negative upshot
of Addams’ arguments, and a characteristically pragmatist one at that.
In a nutshell, her arguments show that it is only in the context of a maxi-
mally fostered world of ongoing, practically performed solidary activities
that such commitments erstwhile can acquire some articulation. We there-
fore, in pursuing peace, are impossibly done with thinking things through
and making a one-time decision to adopt certain rules. Rather, we have
to set in motion and take charge of an ongoing process of development
and active detection of needs. For, if our pursuit of peace and the attention
to the substance of solidary practices demanded by it bring to the fore
36. Cf., as one example among many, Senghaas (2007).
120 Enrahonar 46, 2011 Axel Mueller
needs without the satisfaction of which classical political human rights
would be not worth having, or a shallow equipment to have in view of
one’s needs, then averting the persistence of such needs by granting the
right to have them equally satisfied whenever they are satisfied somewhere
on the planet and committing to policies of lending such entitlements
empirical force would be equally part and parcel of our pursuit of peace,
and thereby of our moral point of view. As Addams’ pragmatist arguments
can be taken to show, success in solidarity is not only reason for human-
itarian joy, but also the source of probabilistically relevant reasons in sup-
port of the pursuit of higher and more difficult aims like global peace-
making. Addams’ passionate arguments remind us that, whether we like
it or not, and whether we see it or not, we can no longer deny having
future-directed commitment and task to seek global peace with all its
entailments once we embark on charitable and remedial policies at all. Once
we become aware of ourselves and our spontaneous actions that are appar-
ently fueled by moral sentiments, there may be fewer reasons for joy and self-
contentment than reasons to take on the incomparably harder and more
arduous task to really practically work, vote for and advocate a better
and more peaceful world. This call for practical work, engagement and
public intervention is definitely «more aggressive» than traditional forms
of humanitarian concern and peace theorizing. There is not only a lot to
learn from Addams, but above all, a lot left to do for us who claim her
lessons.
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